Maxwell Rosenthal

Assistant Professor

Member Of:
  • School of Economics
Office Phone: 404-894-4919
Office Location: Old CE 219
Related Links:
Email Address: rosenthal@gatech.edu

Overview

Max Rosenthal joined the School of Economics at Georgia Tech as an Assistant Professor in August 2019.  His research mostly lies in the area of microeconomic theory, with emphases in contract theory, mechanism design, and information design.  In particular, Max has recently studied the incorporation of consumer choice data into the design and pricing of complex products.  Elsewhere, he has investigated risk taking in moral hazard problems by individuals with heterogeneous risk preferences, with applications to employment contracting and executive compensation.  More broadly, Max’s work is concerned with the implications of uncertainty for the design of incentives and the allocation of goods.

Before coming to Georgia Tech, Max completed his doctoral studies in Economics at the University of Arizona.

Education:
  • Ph.D., University of Arizona
  • M.A., University of Colorado Denver
  • B.A., University of Colorado

Interests

Teaching Interests:
I currently teach undergraduate courses in Game Theory and a doctoral course in Microeconomic Theory. Previously, I have taught Microeconomic Theory in our Master's program.
Research Interests:
I work primarily on prior-free approaches to contract theory, mechanism design, and information design. I have a secondary interest in partial identification of both microeconomic theory models and of microeconometric models, and I have a special focus on developing methodologies for doing data-driven economic design.
Research Fields:
  • Game Theory
  • Microeconomic Theory

Courses

  • ECON-4180: Game Theory Economics
  • ECON-6106: Microeconomic Analysis
  • ECON-7012: Microeconomic Theory I

Publications

Journal Articles

  • Energy price pass-through with long-term contracts
    In: Economics Letters [Peer Reviewed]
    Date: January 2026

    We study the pass-through of wholesale natural gas prices into 12-month fixed-rate residential contracts in Georgia’s deregulated natural gas market. Our theoretical model suggests that socially optimal contracts should uniformly pass through future wholesale fuel costs during the contract period. We find that total pass-through is close to complete, but almost entirely driven by contemporaneous and lagged wholesale prices. Future price pass-through is limited and sometimes negative, deviating from the theoretical socially optimal benchmark.

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Updated:  Feb 10th, 2026 at 12:42 PM