Trade Interdependence, the International Financial Institutions, and the Recent Evolution of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations
| Title: | Trade Interdependence, the International Financial Institutions, and the Recent Evolution of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Publication Date: | October 2002 |
| Published In: | Journal of International Economics |
| Description: | This paper analyzes the effect of a debtor country’s pattern of trade with commercial creditors’ home countries on the outcome of debt-rescheduling negotiations. The analysis reveals that a debtor country with more market power has greater leverage in a three-way debt-rescheduling negotiation that includes the debtor country, its creditors and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). The paper also considers the effects of the IFI sovereign-debt policy on the bargaining power of the parties in debt-rescheduling negotiations. Two bargaining frameworks analyzed and compared in the paper represent the negotiation mechanism at different stages of the IFI sovereign-debt policy evolution. |
| Ivan Allen College Contributors: | |
| Citation: | Klimenko, Mikhail M. "Trade Interdependence, the International Financial Institutions, and the Recent Evolution of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations." Journal of International Economics 58.1 (2002): 177-209. |
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